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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0000O0000 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRANT K. STRAUSBURG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940241-CA 
Priority No. 2 
•ooooOoooo-
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from Circuit Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(d) (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE I3SVES 
1. Did defendant fail to preserve for appeal the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and Miranda issues? 
2. If defendant preserved the HGN issue for appeal, does 
the test meet the "inherent reliability" standard enunciated in 
the Phillips, Kofford. Rimmasch line of cases for admissibility 
under URE 702? 
3. If defendant preserved the Miranda issue for appeal, 
were the police required to advise him of his rights before 
questioning him? 
4. If the HGN results and defendant's statements were 
admitted in error, was it prejudicial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rulings on issues of law are reviewed under a "correction of 
error" standard. City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 518 
1 
(Utah) cert, denied. Ill S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol causing an injury accident and leaving the scene of an 
injury accident. Trial on those charges was scheduled for March 
3, 1994 before the Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
On March 2, 1994, a day before trial, defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the HGN test results. While in Judge Sawayafs 
chambers minutes before trial, defense counsel told the court 
that defendant had filed a motion. The court summarily denied it 
without argument from either counsel. During the trial, the 
court overruled defendant's objection to the HGN evidence. 
During trial, defendant also objected to statements he made 
to a police officer about the traffic accident. But the court 
overruled the objection. 
On March 4, 1994, a jury found defendant guilty of both 
charges and was sentenced on March 31, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Shortly after midnight on May 6, 1994, defendant was driving 
his flatbed semi-truck north on 900 East in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. (Trail Transcript at 165, 168) (hereinafter T) . It was 
raining and the roads were slick. (T. 19, 57, 170) . As he 
approached Van Winkle Boulevard (5600 South), the left-hand turn 
signal was changing to yellow. (T. 18, 169) . Despite the road 
conditions, defendant hurled his 80,000 pound truck through the 
light, causing his trailer to jackknife. (T. 53, 125). The 
trailer slammed into a white car stopped in the adjacent lane, 
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which in turn hit a car stopped in front of it. (T. 17, 18, 23, 
53) . The force of the impact caused a loud noise and spun the 
two cars around, shooting them into the middle of the 
intersection. (T. 20, 28, 31, 34). The occupants in each car 
were injured. (T. 21, 29, 34). Neither driver knew what had hit 
them. (T. 20, 28, 30) . 
Despite the loud noise and extensive damage to the cars, 
defendant failed to stop. (T. 24, 31, 34) . Witnesses to the 
accident were able to get a description of defendant's fleeing 
truck, which was broadcast to law enforcement in the area. (T. 
23, 39, 48). 
Defendant continued along Van Winkle to 2700 South, down to 
State Street and back to 3300 South where he parked his semi-
truck in front of his father's house on 500 East, some forty-
minutes after the accident. (T. 39, 40, 130, 178) . Before 
stopping, Officer David Richards of the Granite School District 
Police Department had spotted defendant's semi-truck on 3300 
South and pulled up behind. (T. 39) . When Richards briefly 
spoke to defendant and his passenger, Mitchell Webb, he told them 
that their truck matched the description of a truck involved in 
an hit-and-run accident. (T. 41-42). He also smelled an odor of 
alcohol and noticed that their eyes were bloodshot and glassy. 
(T. 42). 
Richards radioed the sheriff's office. (T. 43). Sargent 
Mohler was the first to arrive. (T . 3 ) He inspected the 
truck and found white transfer paint on the trailer. (T. 50). 
Mohler then asked defendant whether he had been involved in an 
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accident on 9th East and Van Winkle. (T. 55). Defendant denied 
being in an accident and stated that he had been up on Wasatch 
Boulevard, coming down 3300 South where the truck was stopped. 
(T. 55). But when Mohler told him that there were witnesses, 
defendant admitted to deputies he had been on 900 East and Van 
Winkle. (T. 56, 192). 
At trial, defense counsel objected to this evidence by 
simply stating "[y]our Honor, I would object at this point." (T. 
55). The court overruled the objection after a bench conference. 
(T. 55) . But defendant did not object when Deputy Mortensen 
testified about the same conversation. (T. 192). 
At that point, Mohler turned the investigation over to 
Mortensen to access whether defendant was impaired. (T. 54) . 
Mortensen had received specialized training in looking for 
impaired drivers. (T. 70). He had attended the Utah Highway 
Patrol DUI course and National Highway Traffic Safety (NHTSA) 
drug recognition school. (T. 66, 83). During the last four 
years, he had investigated at least fifty DUI cases and 
administered field sobriety test approximately 400 times. (T. 
65, 83, 94). 
When Mortensen spoke with defendant, he too noticed an odor 
of alcohol on his breath and that his eyes were red and glassy. 
Defendant's speech was slightly slurred. (T. 71-72) . Based upon 
these physical characteristics, Mortensen explained and 
demonstrated five field sobriety tests to defendant: (1) the 
finger count, (2) one-leg stand, (3) heel-to-toe, (4) alphabet 
and (5) horizontal gaze nystagmus. (T. 74-82). 
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On the finger count test, defendant performed it four times, 
instead of the requested three, and touched the sides of his 
fingers, instead of the tips. (T. 74-75). A person who fails to 
touch the tips of his fingers and performs the test more times 
than requested, shows a lack of concentration and ability to 
follow instructions. (T. 76). Because of these errors, 
defendant failed this test. (T. 76). 
The defendant also failed the one-leg stand test. (T. 77). 
Mortensen told defendant to raise his foot three to six inches 
off the ground and to count to thirty in one thousand increments. 
(T. 77). When the deputy gives this test, he is looking for 
whether people hop, use their arms for balance, put their foot 
down or stop the test. (T. 77). Defendant made several of these 
mistakes: he lost his balance, put his foot down on the count of 
five and stopped the test at fifteen. (T. 77). 
In the heel-to-toe test, the deputy told defendant to hold 
his hands to his sides, take nine steps down with the heel of one 
foot touching the toe of his other foot, turn around, and walk 
back in the same way, taking seven steps. (T. 78). Defendant 
used his arms for balance and had difficulty balancing while 
walking. (T. 78). 
On the HGN test, Mortensen held a pen twelve to fifteen 
inches in front of each of a defendant's eyes to determine three 
clues: (i) whether his eyes smoothly followed the pen, (ii) 
whether his eyes showed nystagmus at maximum deviation and (iii) 
the angle of onset of nystagmus in each of his eyes. (T. 80-81, 
102). On this test, defendant's eyes could not pursue the pen 
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smoothly and he had noticeable nystagmus at maximum deviation. 
(T. 81) . Mortensen could not recall the angel of onset of 
nystagmus for defendant. (T. 81). 
When the State began questioning Mortensen at trial about 
HGN, defendant objected when counsel stated " [y]our Honor, I'm 
going to object to the introduction of this evidence." (T. 79). 
The court responded with "[o]bjection overruled. I think it's 
something the jury can consider. Go ahead." (T. 79). 
The final test defendant performed was the alphabet test. 
(T. 82) . Mortensen asked him to recite the alphabet twice, 
starting with the letter B and ending with the letter S. (T. 
82) . He successfully completed the first recitation, but failed 
the second by starting with the letter B. (T. 82). 
Based upon defendant's physical characteristics and failure 
to adequately perform all of the field sobriety tests, Mortensen 
believed that defendant was impaired and arrested him. (T. 82, 
88) . When he then read defendant the DUI admonition, he agreed 
to take a chemical test. (T. 83-85). However, while on his way 
to take the test, defendant decided not to take it. He stated to 
the deputy that "I'm not going to lie anymore." (T. 86). "I 
believe that I've had four beers in the last hour and a half, and 
I believe this would put me over the limit. And it's easier to 
do it this way." (T. 86, 87). 
At trial, defendant claimed that he did not hear the 
accident and was confused as to where he had been. (T. 170, 173, 
174) . He also claimed that he had not felt any effect from the 
alcohol and performed well on all the field sobriety tests. (T. 
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179, 188). The jury was not persuaded by his explanations. At 
the conclusion of the trail, they convicted defendant of driving 
under the influence causing an injury accident and leaving the 
scene of an injury accident. (T. 237). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to preserve the HGN issue for appeal. 
His motion was untimely. No record was created to establish the 
basis for the court's denial of the motion. Neither did he 
properly object to the evidence when offered by the State during 
trial. 
If defendant preserved the HGN issue, the test is inherently 
reliable and the trial court could have taken judicial notice of 
its reliability based upon existing scientific literature and 
supporting case law. The State was not required to make a 
foundational showing of the test's scientific grounding through 
expert witnesses. 
Defendant also failed to preserve the Miranda issue for 
appeal. Defendant did not properly object to the admission of 
his statements and failed to object when a second police witness 
testify about the same conversation. 
If defendant preserved this issue, the police were not 
required to give him a Miranda warning because he was not in 
custody. The questioning of defendant was merely investigatory. 
Whether the HGN results and statements were improperly 
admitted, is harmless error. All of the other evidence in the 
case provided a basis for the jury to convict defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. COURT SHOULD NOT REACH HGN AND MIRANDA ISSUES BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THEM FOR APPEAL. 
If appellants fail to properly preserve an issue for appeal, 
they have waived that issue. State v. Brown, 856 P. 2d 358, 359 
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The burden rests on the party raising 
the issue on appeal to take those steps necessary to preserve the 
issue for appellate review and determination. Id. ; Broberg v. 
Hess, 782 P. 2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Appellate courts 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. 
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 
(Utah 1993). 
A. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HGN WAS UNTIMELY. 
Rule 12(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires all motions "concerning the admissibility of evidence" 
be raised at least five days prior to trial. "Failure of the 
defendant ... to make requests which must be made prior to trial 
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof." 
Rule 12(d). 
In this case, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
HGN test on March 2, 1994. On March 3, 1994 -- one day later --
the trial was held. Defendant's motion violated the five day 
rule of Rule 12 and consequently, was untimely. Because it was 
untimely, he has waived his right to object to admission of the 
test. 
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Moreover, no hearing was ever scheduled on the motion. 
Instead, defendant raised the motion for the first time in the 
judge's chambers minutes before the trial began. The State never 
had the opportunity to object to the timeliness of the motion. 
Nor did it have the opportunity to present any evidence in 
support of its use of the HGN test or to rebut defendant's 
motion. As a result, the court never had the opportunity to 
consider evidence supplied by both sides and make an informed 
ruling. We do not know the basis for the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion because there is no record of its decision nor 
a written order. On appeal, this court has no information to 
consider in determining the propriety of the trial court's 
actions. 
B. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY OBJECT TO ADMISSION 
OF HGN AND HIS STATEMENTS DURING TRIAL. 
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a timely, 
specific objection to preserve evidentiary errors for appeal. 
State v. Range1. 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation 
of error must be made part of the trail court record before 
appellate court will review such claim on appeal); State v. 
Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989) (specific, timely 
objections must be made to preserve issue for appeal). 
When the State began questioning Mortensen about HGN, 
defense counsel stated "[y]our Honor, I'm going to object to the 
introduction of this evidence." (T. 79). The court overruled 
the objection. (T. 79) . The record shows defendant at no time 
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stated the basis for his objection as required by Rule 103(a). 
Therefore, defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
This failure is not cured by defendant's motion to suppress. 
In State v. Lasey. 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), the supreme court 
held that under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a specific 
objection is required even when a pretrial motion to suppress has 
been made. The court reasoned that even though a pretrial motion 
to suppress evidence had been made and denied, an objection to 
the admissibility of the evidence at trial should have been made 
because the trial judge was not the same judge who had ruled on 
the motion and there was no indication in the record that an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion had been conducted. 
The court further elaborated this decision in State v. 
Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 1987), by holding that a 
defendant is not required to object or renew his or her objection 
at trial to preserve an issue for appeal when the trial judge is 
the same one who ruled on the pretrial motion and when the record 
or transcript indicates that a hearing was held on the motion. 
While the trial judge in this case was the same judge who 
denied defendant's motion, there is no record or transcript 
indicating that a hearing was ever held. There is no record 
because the discussion about defendant's motion was held in the 
judge's chambers off the record. Without a record, defendant was 
required by Lacey to make a timely and specific objection when 
the State introduced evidence about HGN. Defendant failed to 
make a specific objection to the HGN evidence. 
Defendant also failed to preserve the Miranda issue for 
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appeal. When the State asked Mohler about the conversation he 
have with the defendant, defense counsel stated "[y]our Honor, I 
would object at this point." (T. 55). A bench conference was 
then held and the court then overruled the objection on the 
record. (T. 55) . Once again, defendant failed to state a 
specific objection on the record. 
Furthermore, defendant failed to make any objection when 
Mortensen testified about the same conversation. (T. 192) . 
Without an objection, defendant waived his right to now claim on 
appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. 
II. IF DEFENDANT PRESERVED HGN ISSUE FOR APPEAL, TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE BECAUSE TEST MEETS 
THE "INHERENT RELIABILITY" REQUIREMENTS OF URE 702 
AND DEFINED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
A. THE "INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD" APPLIES TO THE 
HGN TEST. 
Beginning with Phillipg v, Jackson. 615 P.2d 1230, 1234 
(Utah 1980) (predating the adoption of URE 702) , the court 
defined the requirements of the "inherent reliability" test for 
admission of scientific evidence. 
The courts in admitting new scientific evidence have 
frequently relied on the practical application of a 
principle in a given discipline or area of endeavor as 
a sufficient indication of reliability .... However, 
the rule requiring general acceptance should not be too 
restrictively applied. [N]either newness nor lack of 
absolute certainty in a test suffices to render it 
inadmissible in court. Every useful new development 
must have its first day in court. (Citations omitted). 
The Phillips court also stated that "[v]erification of the 
basic principle and its application through widespread 
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replication and practical usage is an appropriate indica of 
reliability." Id. at 1233. The fact that the relevant 
scientific evidence is new or knowledge of it is limited to a 
small, specialized group of experts will not preclude a finding 
of reliability. id. at 1234. 
In Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1346-1348 (Utah 1987), 
the court abandoned exclusive reliance on the Frye test in favor 
of Utah Rule of Evidence 702, although recognizing that Frye 
might retain its validity in some instances. 
The court further clarified in State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 
1203, 1211 (Utah 1989), that the threshold requirement for 
admissibility is "inherent reliability of the scientific 
principles and techniques upon which the proffered evidence is 
based" under Rule 702. State v. Rimmaschf 775 P.2d 388, 396-397 
(Utah 1990), reiterated that "inherent reliability" rather that 
"general acceptance" was the touchstone of admissibility and a 
showing of general acceptance would normally also establish 
inherent reliability thus justifying admission of the evidence. 
Defendant claims that Rimmasch recognizes in certain 
circumstances the continuing requirement to meet the Frye 
standard for "novel" scientific principles or techniques. Id. at 
396. In Rimmasch, the State argued that Rule 702 did away with 
the Frye standard and Phillips "inherent reliability" standard 
requiring only that the evidence be relevant and of assistance to 
the trier of fact. The court specifically stated that 
"regardless of how Rule 702 phrases the general test for the 
admissibility of expert testimony, our case law superimposes a 
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more restrictive test whenever scientific evidence is at issue, 
and that more restrictive test was set forth in Phillips." Jd. at 
397. That more restrictive test is "inherent reliability." It 
is against this standard by which this court should judge the 
admissibility of the HGN test results. 
B. HGN IS INHERENTLY RELIABLE. 
The horizontal gaze nystagmus test is based on the 
physiological correlation between degree of intoxication as 
measured by blood alcohol content and degree of nystagmus 
evidenced in individuals.1 Specifically, an administering 
officer, using an object held about twelve to fifteen inches away 
from a suspect's face, will move that object across the suspect's 
field of vision and take note of the suspect's eye movement 
(degree of nystagmus) in three ways: 1) ability of the suspect's 
lateral eye movement to track the object smoothly, 2) degree of 
pronounced nystagmus (bouncing of the eye) at the angle of an 
eye's maximum deviation, and 3) the angle at which the onset of 
nystagmus becomes visible.2 The question is whether the three-
1
 Aschan, Different Types of Alcohol Nystagmus . Acta 
Otolaryngologica Supp. 14 0:69; Lehti, The Effect of Blood Alcohol 
Concentration pn the Onset of Gaze Nystagmus, 13 Blutalkohol 411 
(1976) ; Simpson-Crawford and Slater, Eye Signs in Suspected 
Drinking Drivers: Clinical Examination and Relation to Blood 
Alcohol, N.Z. Med. J. (Aug. 1971); Wilkinson, Kime and Tharp, 
Burns, Moskowitz, Development and Field Sobriety Test of 
Psychophysical Tests for DUI Arrests: U.S. Dept. of 
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
Office of Driver and Pedestrian Research, DOT-HS-8-01970 (March 
1981)(hereinafter 1981 NHTSA Study). 
2
 Improved Fielfl Sobriety Testing. U.S. Pep ' t of 
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
DOT-HS-806-512 (January 1984)(hereinafter "1984 NHSTA Study"). 
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part test is an accurate predictor of intoxication. 
The HGN test has been in use for over 3 0 years, but has only 
been adopted for use in DUI prosecutions since the early 1980's. 
California police initially observed the phenomenon with 
barbiturate users in the I960's.3 
In the 1970's, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) contracted with the Southern California 
Research Institute to assess the field sobriety tests then in use 
and to develop a standardized test battery. Initially, ten 
different sobriety test were administered to 238 volunteers with 
blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) between .00 and .15 percent. 
The three "best" test were then selected for additional 
study: HGN, walk and turn and the one-leg stand.4 These tests 
were administered to 297 volunteers with BACs from .00 to .18 
percent.5 NHTSA found that the same battery of tests administered 
by police officers in the field correctly classified BAC as being 
either above or below .10 percent eighty-one percent of the time. 
The remaining classifications were 9 percent positives and 10 
percent false negatives -- suggesting that there is not great 
bias for either overestimation or underestimation. The report 
concluded, " [c]learly, nystagmus angle of onset is an excellent 
tool for predicting the BAC when it is measured with sufficient 
60 ALR 4th 1130-1131. 
1981 NHSTA Study, supra at 2. 
Id. at 72. 
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precision."6 
In 1985, Drs. Goding and Dobie from the University of 
Washington conducted a field study of HGN.7 Forty-six patients 
in an emergency room setting and hundred fifty-nine people 
suspected of DUI had their blood alcohol concentrations estimated 
by the angle of onset of HGN and then submitted to either a blood 
or breath test to confirm the results. The results of the 
chemical test were not known to the person giving the HGN test. 
In the emergency room group, ninety-six percent of people 
with BAC's over .10 percent were correctly identified by HGN as 
legally intoxicated. There were no cases where BAC was 
incorrectly estimated above .10 percent in the absence of other 
drugs known to cause nystagmus. 
With the DUI suspects, there was a .878 correlation between 
estimated and actual BAC. Three subjects were incorrectly 
classified as intoxicated. No subjects with an estimated BAC 
less than .10 percent were incorrectly classified. Goding and 
Dobie concluded that alcohol gaze nystagmus is an effective tool 
for estimating BAC.8 
In 1958, Aschan differentiated between alcohol gaze 
nystagmus and positional alcohol nystagmus using 




 Goding and Dobie, Gfrzg Nystagmus and Blood Alcohol, 96 
Laryngoscope 713 (July 1986). 
8
 Id. at 1. 
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(deviation = 40 degrees) appeared when BAC rose above a certain 
threshold (typically .06) and disappeared when BAC was less.5 In 
his report, Aschon commented that while the 
electronystagmographic recording device may detect nystagmus at 
.03 to .05 percent, when observed only visually, a borderline 
value of .08 percent was found.10 Although he suggested no 
conclusion, it appears to be a logical assumption that under .08 
percent, the nystagmus is too slight for it to constitute the 
definite jerking or bouncing for which the officer is instructed 
to look.11 He also confirmed that the angle of onset decreases 
as BAC increases. The 0.778 correlation coefficient found by 
Lehti corresponds to the NHTSA studies finding of 0.76 
correlation of BAC to angle of onset.12 
A study presented in the Journal of the American Optometric 
Association concluded that by correctly identifying eighty 
percent of intoxicated drivers with a BAC over .10 percent, HGN 
was "more accurate than the traditional coordination or mental 
computation tests previously used."13 And a 1974 Finish study 
concluded that the HGN and walk-and-line (walk-and-turn) tests 
were the most accurate indicators of BAC levels in a test battery 
9
 Aschan, supra; See also Goding and Dobie, supra at 9. 
1 0
 Aschan, supra, at 76. 
11
 Id. 
12 Lehti, supra. 
1 3
 Halperin and Yoltan, Is the Driver Drunk? Oculomotor 
Sobriety Testing, 57:9 Journal of the American Optometric 
Association 653 (Sept. 1986). 
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including "finger-to-nose, picking up matches, counting 
backwards, time and place orientation, and observations of 
general behavior.14 
Not only is HGN finding growing acceptance in the scientific 
community, but also in a growing number of courts. Some have 
found it admissible under a "general acceptance" or "reliability", 
test. Arizona has been the leading jurisdiction in allowing 
HGN evidence. In State v. Superior Court (Blake) . 718 P. 2d 171 
(Ariz. 1986), the Arizona Supreme Court specifically found that 
the HGN test meets the standard. At the evidentiary hearing, the 
court heard evidence from Dr. Burns, Director of the Southern 
California Research Institute (SCRI), one of the developers of 
the standard battery of field sobriety tests and an author of the 
NHTSA study and a research psychologist, specializing in the 
effects of alcohol on behavior. She testified that SCRI found 
HGN to be the best single index of intoxication because it is an 
involuntary response based on the known principle that certain 
substances, including alcohol, cause nystagmus. She further 
testified that BAC can be estimated from the angle of onset of 
nystagmus. 
The court also heard testimony from Sargent Studdard of the 
Los Angeles Police Department, one of the - pioneers in the 
development of the HGN test, and Sargent Raynor of the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety. They testified as to HGN's 
usefulness in identifying DUI' s in the .10 to .15 percent range 
Tharp et. al., supra at 1-2. 
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when a number of drivers were able to pass the other tests. 
Studdard also testified that based on his experience in the field 
and as a consultant to NHTSA, the accuracy of the HGN test in 
identifying impaired drivers was between 80-90 percent. Jd. at 
173-174. 
In addition to the foregoing testimony, the court considered 
twenty-nine different articles on nystagmus in general and HGN in 
particular listed in the appendices to the court's opinion. The 
court then considered two issues: (1) can HGN be used to 
establish probable cause, and (2) are the results admissible 
under the Frye standard. 
The court observed that nystagmus is a well-known 
physiological phenomenon and that the HGN test was used by some 
law enforcement agencies even before NHTSA commissioned the SCRI 
study. The NHTSA found it the most sensitive of all tests, that 
in a survey of 800 trained officers eighty percent rated it the 
most sensitive and use of the test substantially increased DUI 
arrests. Therefore, in the hands of a trained officer, the HGN 
test was reasonably trustworthy and could be used to establish 
probable cause. Id. at 176-177. 
In determining whether the test results were admissible, the 
court considered the relevant scientific community, recognizing 
that the field was likely to be self-limiting, and whether there 
was a general acceptance in the appropriate disciplines. The 
court defined the appropriate disciplines as highway safety and 
behavioral psychology and to a lesser extent, neurology and 
criminalistics. The court concluded based on its own research 
18 
listed in Appendix B to the case, that professionals who had 
studied the issue do not dispute the correlation between BAC and 
nystagmus. 1&. at 18 0. Furthermore, the higher the BAC, the 
earlier the onset of nystagmus. And the court found that the 
test had undergone sufficient scrutiny to be considered reliable. 
Id. at 181. It stated: 
We believe that the HGN test satisfies the Frye 
standards. The evidence demonstrates that the 
following propositions have gained general acceptance 
in the scientific community: (1) HGN occurs in 
conjunction with alcohol consumption; (2) its onset and 
distinctness are correlated to BAC; (3) BAC in excess 
of .10 percent can be estimated with reasonable 
accuracy from the combination of the eye's tracking 
ability, the angle of onset of nystagmus and the degree 
of nystagmus at maximum deviation; and (4) officers can 
be trained to observe these phenomena sufficiently to 
estimate accurately whether BAC is above or below .10 
percent. 
Based on these findings, the court held the HGN test to be 
admissible as any other sobriety test on the issue of 
intoxication provided proper foundation is laid as to the 
officer's training and experience. Id. 
The court also held, however, that it was not admissible to 
establish BAC over .10 percent in the absence of chemical test 
because its recognized margin of error would make it 
inappropriate to prove being over the per se limit and a 
violation of Arizona statutes defining a chemical test. HGN 
evidence may be used to corroborate a challenged breath test or 
in an impairment case to establish being "under the influence" 
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but not to quantify BAC. Xd.15; See also State ex. rel. McDougall 
v. Rickes, 778 P.2d 1358 (Ariz. App. 1989); State ex rel. 
Hamilton v. City Court of Mesa, 799 P.2d 855 (Ariz. 1990). 
At least three other courts, relying substantially on the 
Blake opinion, have specifically held that the HGN test satisfies 
Frye. People v. Beunina. 592 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (111. App. 5 
Dist. 1992); State v. Garrett. 811 P.2d 488, 491 (Idaho 1991); 
State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 886-887 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
1990) . Although Utah no longer requires Frye, meeting the Frye 
standard very likely meets the inherent reliability standard. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396-397. 
In People v. Ouinn, 580 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Dist. Ct. 1991), the 
trial court heard testimony from nine expert witnesses including, 
Dr. Burns, retired Sargent Studdard of the LAPD (both of whom 
testified in the Blake case), a medical doctor, an optometrist, a 
toxicologist and several police officers. The appellate court 
was asked to address the Frye issue. The court held HGN 
admissible but it is unclear whether it specifically held HGN 
meets Frye or that it is not a scientific test requiring the Frye 
analysis. After a lengthy discussion, the court did state that 
Frye did not require that the technique be infallible and that 
1 5
 Current HGN protocol advises that rather that estimate the 
specific angle of onset, the officer only determine if he sees 
nystagmus at 45 degrees or less. The 45 degree angle roughly 
corresponds to a .10 percent BAC and the lesser the angle, the 
higher the BAC. Since .10 percent is the per se limit in all but 
five states, and HGN is not intended as a substitute for a 
chemical test, it is not thought necessary to determine BAC other 
than whether it is likely to exceed .10 percent. 
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defendant's requirements arguments went to the weight and not 
admissibility. 
Many states have abandoned in whole or in part reliance on 
Frye in admitting scientific evidence. Some of these states, 
however, have a threshold showing of reliability before 
admissibility. In outlining its acceptance of the HGN test, the 
Ohio Supreme Court, in addition to the 1981 NTHSA study, cited at 
least five other works or scientific literature examining the 
relationship between alcohol ingestion and nystagmus, as will as 
discussing the HGN test. The same opinion also cited a 1984 
Department of Transportation test manual as characterizing HGN as 
"the single most accurate field test to use in determining 
whether a person is alcohol impaired." State v. Bresson, 554 
N.E.2d 1330, 1336 (Ohio 1990). The only foundation is the 
officer's training and ability to administer and interpret that 
test and the results are admissible as any field sobriety tests. 
Id.; See also State v. Scott, 606 N.E.2d 1023 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 
1992); State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853 (Mont. 1988); State v. 
Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1990); State v. Nagel, 506 N.E.2d 
285 (Ohio App. 1986) . 
State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627 (Alaska App. 1990), addressed 
only the issue of whether HGN was in itself sufficient probable 
causes to arrest. Defendant passed all the field sobriety tests 
except the HGN. He was arrested and a subsequent breath test 
showed .145 percent. Defendant's independent blood test was .115 
percent. 
At the evidentiary hearing, in addition to the police 
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officers, Dr. Emery, a neurologist, and Dr. Propst, a 
pathologist, testified. Dr. Emery testified that HGN was a 
reliable screening test in his profession for alcohol 
intoxication. Also that it was a sensitive indicator of 
intoxication. He also stated that the test was easy to learn and 
administer and his review of the police training manuals led him 
to believe officers could do "a very good job" of administering 
the test to obtain reliable results. Both Drs. Emery and Propst 
testified that HGN is involuntary and cannot be practiced as can 
other sobriety tests, Id. at 629. Dr. Emery also testified that 
some people above a .10 percent can still perform adequately on 
the sobriety tests and that the HGN test was the most accurate. 
Id. at 631. The court also had copies of the 1981 NHTSA Study 
and the Goding & Dobie report. 
The court determined the HGN test was sufficiently reliable 
to establish probable cause to arrest, when defendant passed 
other sobriety tests. It declined to rule on whether HGN was 
independent evidence of intoxication or whether it could be used 
to corroborate a chemical test since those issues were not before 
the court. id. at 630. 
Several other courts have admitted HGN evidence without a 
discussion of its reliability. State v. Sullivan. 426 N.E.2d 766 
(S.C. 1993); Emerson v. State, 846 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-Corpus 
Christi 1993); Finley v. State, 809 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.-Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1991); People v. Furnessr 526 N.E.2d 947 (111. App. 
5 Dist. 1988) . 
But not all jurisdictions have allowed HGN evidence. In 
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each of these cases, the prosecution relied solely upon the 
testimony of the arresting officer which the courts held 
insufficient. None of these courts held HGN per se inadmissible 
or that it did not meet Frye, only that the evidence was 
insufficient to make that determination. People v. Loomis. 203 
Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Super. 1984); People v. Vega. 496 N.E.2d 501 
(111. App. 4 Dist. 1986); State v. Rees. 732 P.2d 66 (Or. App. 
1987) . 
Defendant relies upon State v. Witte. 836 P. 2d 1110 (Kan. 
1992) for the claim that HGN is scientifically unreliable because 
the court concluded that the test's reliability was not a settled 
proposition in the scientific community based on its review of 
case law and some of the available literature. Xd. at 1119-1120. 
Although the court ruled against admissibility, it is not clear 
whether the court found that the HGN test did not satisfy Frye or 
that there was insufficient evidence upon which to base its 
opinion. 
Before this court rules on whether HGN satisfies the 
Frye admissibility requirement, a trial court first 
should have an opportunity to examine, weigh, and 
decide disputed facts to determine whether the test is 
sufficiently reliable to be admissible for any purpose 
in Kansas. 
Id. at 1120. The only evidence presented at trial was the 
arresting officer's testimony. If the court's holding is that 
the HGN test does not meet Frye (or some other measure of 
reliability), the decision is clearly contrary to the current 
trend to allow HGN evidence. If, however, the court believed 
there was insufficient foundation, then the result is that only 
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the evidence was insufficient to make a determination about the 
admissibility of HGN. 
There are several points of the Witte court's analysis that 
are troubling. For example, Witte cites Halperin and Yolton, as 
expressing concerns over the use of HGN. The court seems to 
ignore their expressed opinion that nystagmus is well-documented 
scientifically and that "nystagmus testing is an important new 
development in the fight against drunk drivers."16 
Witte also cites studies which show that fifty to sixty 
percent of the population will show nystagmus at maximum 
deviation. This concern was addressed in the 1981 NHTSA study. 
It also ignores the other two components of the test. If an 
individual exhibits nystagmus only at maximum deviation, he will 
"pass" the test. Furthermore, the study which apparently is the 
source of this statistic, does not support this proposition.17 
Defendant questions Moretnson's ability to administer the 
test because the angle of onset is estimated by visual 
observation. While it is true that the laboratory studies use 
mechanical devices to measure the angle, there has been no 
suggestion that this is either feasible or practical for an 
1 6
 Halperin and Yolton, supra at 657. 
1 7
 Whiting, State v^ Witte: Questioning HGN's Frye General 
Acceptance under Blake, Vol. 5, Issue 2, the DRE 7 (Spring 1993). 
Whiting presents a thorough and critical analysis demonstrating 
flaws in the Witte court's understanding and interpretation of 
the scientific articles it cites. The court apparently relied 
more upon the secondary sources (written by defense attorneys) 
interpreting these sources, than upon the primary sources 
themselves. 
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officer in the field. 
The 1984 NHTSA Study specifically discusses the need to 
learn to estimate the angle of onset. Several of the cases 
referred to previously have cited as an advantage to the test the 
ease of its administration at roadside. Learning to detect 
nystagmus is probably the easiest procedure an officer will be 
asked to learn.^ Forty-five degrees usually conforms to an area 
level with the test subject's shoulder. The higher the BAC, the 
closer to the midline of the head nystagmus is noted.19 
Defendant asserts the HGN test is unreliable because 
nystagmus may have other causes. The same could be said for any 
field sobriety test. No one claims that the tests are 100 
percent perfect, only that they are sufficiently reliable to 
establish probable cause and some evidence of intoxication. It 
would be absurd to suppress the test documented to be the most 
reliable in favor of less reliable tests because they are based 
on common knowledge that alcohol ingestion causes physical 
effects.20 
Any objections to admitting HGN is best answered by pointing 
out its basic similarity to other field sobriety tests. All 
roadside tests are based on the some "scientific principle" that 
1 8
 Forkiotis, QptQmetrig Expertise; The Scientific Basis for 
Alcohol Gazed Nystagmus, 59 (No. 7) Curriculum II 1 (1987) . 
1 9
 Id. at 11. 
2 0
 1981 NHTSA Study; Dobie annd Goding report; See also Good 
and Augsbinger, Use of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus as Part of 
Roadside Sobriety Testing, 63 Am. J. of Optometry & Physiological 
Optics 467 (1986). 
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intoxication results in certain physiological reactions. 
Given HGN's basic similarity to the other roadside tests, 
any objection to its admissibility is most likely based on its 
"pretentiously scientific name," Murphy, 451 N.W.2d at 156, or 
the fact that it may lie outside of the average juror's realm of 
common experience. See Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1336 ("[t]he 
admission of the results of the HGN tests is no different from 
any other field sobriety test"); Murphy 451 N.W.2d at 157. 
The Nagel court stated: 
The gaze nystagmus test, as do the other commonly used 
field sobriety tests, requires only the personal 
observation of the officer administering it. It is 
objective in nature and does not required expert 
interpretation. Objective manifestations of 
insobriety, personally observed by the officer, are 
always relevant where, as here, the defendant's 
physical condition is in issue. 
506 N.E.2d at 286. 
The Iowa court allowed the admission of an administering 
officer's testimony who was certified by the Iowa Law Enforcement 
Academy as being competent to administer the HGN test. Murphy, 
451 N.W.2d at 156-58. In a later instance, the court admitted 
the testimony of an officer who received HGN instruction "as part 
of a department-sponsored program of education that has been 
implemented statewide." State v. Edman, 453 N.W.2d 169, 170 
(Iowa 1990). 
The Blakely court found two officers' training sufficient 
when one had experienced "training in ... field administrations 
of the HGN test," and another had trained law enforcement 
agencies in Arizona, Michigan, New York, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
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North Carolina, and Maryland in the HGN test, and had 
subsequently administered the test under roadside conditions to 
"several thousand individuals." 718 P. 2d at 177-78. And the 
Bresson court has held that an officer who had received five days 
training in HGN could testify as to the results of a specific 
instance of testing. 554 N.E.2d at 1335. 
A Louisiana appellate court found HGN testimony admissible 
where an officer "had extensive training . . . in field sobriety 
testing. The officer had been specifically trained in 
administering the HGN test and had been certified by his 
department in administering the test." Armstrong, 561 So.2d at 
887. Montana held such testimony admissible where an officer 
gained certification through the Montana Law Enforcement Academy 
by completing a required number of training hours. Clark, 762 
P. 2d at 857. A Texas court, without addressing the validity of 
the test, has also held that the administering officer need not 
show foundation that he is an expert. Howard v. State, 744 
S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)("any lay witness may give an 
opinion regarding intoxication"). 
Mortenson has had extensive experience with the HGN test 
during his last four years with the sheriff's office. He has 
attended drug recognition classes administered- by the NHTSA and 
DUI classes with the Utah Highway Patrol. He has performed field 
sobriety tests, including HGN, at least 400 times and 
investigated some fifty DUI cases. 
During his testimony, Mortensen stated that when he 
conducted this test, he held a pen twelve to fifteen inches in 
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front of defendant' s eyes and moved the pen slowly across 
defendant's field of vision. In doing this, he found defendant's 
eyes failed to track smoothly and nystagmus was present at 
maximum deviation. 
Based upon Mortensen's training and experience, he was 
qualified to administer the HGN test to defendant. Based upon 
the evidence at trial, he properly administered the test to 
defendant. At no time during the trial did defendant claim that 
Mortensen improperly administer the test. 
C. TRIAL COURT COULD TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF INHERENT 
RELIABILITY OF HGN TEST. 
In Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398, the court discussed two ways 
in which scientific evidence may be presented: (1) judicial 
notice or (2) an evidentiary hearing. "The trial court may base 
its determination on exhibits, treatises or the rationale of 
cases in other jurisdictions." Manley v. State, 424 S.E. 2d 818, 
819 (Ga. App. 1992). Once a substantial number of courts 
recognize a procedure, a trial judge may take judicial notice of 
its reliability without expert testimony. Id. at 820. 
In this case, we do not know why the court allowed the HGN 
evidence because defendant failed to properly address the issue 
prior to trial. We can only surmise the court took judicial 
notice because it admitted the evidence without expert testimony. 
If the court took judicial notice, it was appropriate based upon 
the existing scientific literature and case law supporting HGN. 
Its reliability is as high or higher than already judicially-
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noticed sobriety tests. Because of this reliability, the State 
was not required to make a foundational showing through expert 
witnesses of the test's scientific grounding or reliability. 
III. IF DEFENDANT PRESEVERED MIRANDA ISSUE, POLICE WERE NOT 
REQUIRED TO GIVE DEFENDANT MIRANDA WARNING BECAUSE HE 
WAS NOT IN CUSTODY. 
A temporary detention for the purpose of investigating 
traffic violations is not synonymous with a custodial 
interrogation requiring a Miranda warning. Salt Lake City v. 
Carner. 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). Id. Miranda is 
required when the environment becomes custodial or accusatory. 
Custody is judged by "whether a reasonable person in defendant's 
position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a 
degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Mirquet. 844 
P.2d 995, 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. East. 743 
P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987)). 
The earner court adopted four factors to consider in 
determining whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda 
purposes: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective 
indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of 
interrogation. Id. at 1171. This court later recognized a fifth 
factor: whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation 
freely and willingly. State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100, 1105 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Mirquet. 844 P.2d 995 is the most recent case in which this 
court has applied all five factors. In that case, Officer Paul 
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Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol pulled Joseph Mirquet over 
for speeding on Interstate 15 near Nephi, Utah. Id. at 996. 
While they were sitting in the patrol car, Trooper Mangelson 
smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. Id. He remarked to Mirquet 
'"[i]t's obvious to me that you've been smoking marijuana. 
.You know, there's no question in my mind, Would you like to go 
to the car and get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get 
it?"' Id. In response, Mirquet went to his car and returned to 
the patrol car with a cigarette package containing two rolled 
'"joints."' Id. Trooper Mangleson then searched Mirquet's car 
and found cocaine and more marijuana. Id. 
The trial court suppressed this evidence on the basis that 
Mirquet was in custody when told to retrieve the marijuana and 
entitled to Miranda protections. This court affirmed the 
suppression order. It reasoned that while factors 1, 2, 3 and 5 
individually could not support a conclusion of custody, these 
factors combined with the accusatory nature of Mangelson's 
questions, made "a conclusion of custody inescapable." id. at 
1001. 
Unlike Mirquet, application of the five factors to the 
instant case points away from custody. As to the first factor, 
defendant was questioned on his home field: he was sitting inside 
his own truck in front of his father's home located in a 
residential area. This setting was as free of compulsion as can 
occur when a person is questioned by police. 
As to the second factor, the police found two occupants in 
the truck: the defendant and Webb. While defendant was the 
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primary suspect, the police also spoke to Webb. Not all of the 
focus was on defendant. 
As to the third factor, there were no readied handcuffs, 
locked doors or drawn guns in this case. Defendant was also in 
his own truck and deputies were not accusing him of a crime. 
As to the fourth factor, Mohler's questions to defendant 
came shortly after his arrival. He asked defendant whether he 
had been involved in an accident on 9th East and Van Winkle. 
This was neither an accusatory nor unduly coercive question. It 
was open ended and not likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. This evident by the fact that defendant made a 
nonincriminating statement that he had been no where near Van 
Winkle. Mohler was attempting to establish whether the truck had 
been involved in an accident. Defendant's answer only became 
incriminating when he contradicted himself by admitting he had 
been on 9th East and Van Winkle when Mohler told him there were 
witnesses. 
As to the fifth factor, defendant himself had stopped at his 
father's house. It was not the police who stopped him. 
Defendant is the one who decided when and where to stop. He 
freely and willingly stopped. 
Defendant claims that he was in custody because he was not 
free to leave and relies Mohler's testimony that he would have 
chased him down had he left. However, the Supreme Court in 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984), recognized that 
all persons detained for traffic violations have their freedom 
significantly restrained, and it is unlikely that a person in 
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such a situation would ever feel free to leave. The feeling of 
not being free to leave does not magically convert a traffic 
investigation into custody. Detention must be tantamount to a 
formal arrest before Miranda attaches. 
The evidence related to each of the five factors of custody, 
considered either individually or collectively, leads to the 
conclusion that a reasonable man in defendant's position would 
not have believed that his freedom of action was curtailed to a 
degree associated with an arrest to require a Miranda warning. 
IV. IF ADMISSION OF HGN AND STATEMENTS WERE ERROR, 
IT WAS HARMLESS. 
To establish prejudicial error, defendant must show a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in its absence. 
State v. Feathersone, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In view of the physical 
evidence, defendant's other statements and other evidence of 
intoxication, he would still have been convicted of both charges 
without HGN and his statements. 
Defendant's truck matched the description of a truck 
involved in an accident on 9th East and Van Winkle. The impact 
of the accident caused a loud noise and extensive damage to two 
cars. His truck had white transfer paint on it that matched the 
color of one of the two cars hit on 9th East. 
Richards immediately smelled an odor of alcohol coming from 
the cab of defendant's truck. Mortensen also noticed an odor of 
alcohol on defendant's breath and that his eyes were red and 
glassy. Defendant's speech was slightly slurred. 
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Defendant did poorly on the field sobriety tests and had 
difficulty understanding directions. On the finger count test, 
defendant touched the sides of his fingers, instead of the tips, 
performed this test four times, instead of the requested three. 
In the heel-to-toe, defendant used his arms for balance and had 
difficulty balancing. On the alphabet test, he started with the 
letter A, instead of the letter B as instructed. 
Defendant was also unable to do the one-leg stand. He put 
his foot down on the count of five and stopped the test at 
fifteen. 
On his way to take the test, defendant stated that he was 
not going to lie to him anymore and admitted that he had had four 
beers in the last hour and a half and would be over the legal 
limit and it is just easier to do it this way. 
Standing alone may be none of the foregoing items would be 
sufficient to convict defendant. However, the severity of the 
accident, defendant's physical appearance, speech, lack of 
balance, odor of alcohol, admission of drinking and being over 
the legal limit, poor performance on the field sobriety tests and 
refusal to take a chemical test all support the conviction. 
Although defendant testified he did not feel the effects of the 
alcohol nor was under the influence or hear the accident, the 
jury apparently did not believe him. 
Defendant cites Ex Parte Malone v. City of Silverhill. 575 
P. 2d 106, for the proposition that HGN evidence cannot be 
harmless error. The appellate court originally held harmless in 
light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The Alabama Supreme 
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Court, however, interpreted the Alabama statutes to require a 
determination of whether a substantial right of the party had 
been adversely affected and that overwhelming evidence of guilt 
was insufficient. Id. at 107. 
Witte. 836 P. 2d 1112 also found reversible error. In that 
case, the intoxilyzer reading was .103 percent. The court felt 
that absent HGN evidence, the jury may have determined the 
intoxilyzer reading to be less than .10 percent based on the 
evidence concerning allowed tolerances of the machine. TcL at 
1121- 1122. 
Neither of these two cases are applicable to this appeal. 
Defendant refused a breath test and the Utah standard for 
harmless error differs from Alabama's. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has waived the HGN issue for appeal by failing to 
timely file his motion to suppress, establish a record of the 
court's decision and specifically object to the admission of the 
evidence. He cannot now raise this issue on appeal. 
Assuming defendant has preserved the HGN issue, HGN is a 
inherently reliable test and the appropriate subject of judicial 
notice. The scientific literature establishes a direct 
correlation between alcohol consumption and the onset of 
nystagmus. It also demonstrates that inability of the eyes to 
pursue a moving object without jerking may be alcohol induced. 
The three-part test developed by the SCRI for NHTSA found the HGN 
test to be the single most reliable field sobriety test for 
intoxication. Studies have shown a reliability of between 78 and 
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92 percent. 
Acceptance of HGN is the trend with a significant number of 
courts ruling that the HGN test may be used to establish probable 
cause as well as providing independent evidence of intoxication. 
A few courts have found HGN reliable under a Frye standard, 
notably Arizona, and others have determined that there need only 
be a showing of reliability without meeting Frye. A few have 
accepted HGN without discussion of the courts' underlying 
rationale. 
Of the courts that have heard expert testimony or reviewed 
the scientific literature, only Witte has found that reliability 
is not yet a settled proposition. The Witte court seems to have 
based its opinion on a misunderstanding of the literature and 
reliance on inadequate sources. 
Defendant has also waived the Miranda issue. During the 
trail, he failed to specifically object to the evidence. He also 
failed to object to the same evidence when offered by a second 
police witness. 
If defendant also preserved this issue for appeal, the 
police were not required tc give him a Miranda warning. The five 
factors for determining custody all point toward the conclusion 
that his incriminating statements were made while the police were 
merely investigating the accident. Defendant was sitting in his 
truck in front of his father's house, he was not the only police 
questioned, he was being accused of committing a crime and he was 
stopped before the police even arrived at his father's house. 
In light of the other evidence of intoxication, defendant's 
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other incriminating statements and physical evidence, any error 
in the admission of HGN and defendant's statements was harmless, 
and the jury verdict should be upheld. 
ot\k 
Dated this _[ day of December, 1994. 
ff faffy 
Cy H / l C a s t l e 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
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41-6-24. Traffic-control signal — At intersec-
tions — At place other than intersec-
tion — Color of light signal — Inopera-
tive traffic-control signals. 
(1) (a) Green, red, and yellow are the only colors 
that may he used in traffic-control signals, except 
for special pedestrian signals that may use white 
and orange. 
(b) Traffic-control signals indicate and apply 
to operators of vehicles and pedestrians as pro-
vided in this section. 
(2) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (ii), ve-
hicular traffic facing a circular green signal 
may: 
(A) proceed straight through the in-
tersection; 
(B) turn right; or 
(C) turn left. 
(ii) Vehicular traffic facing a circular 
green signal, including vehicles turning 
right or left: 
(A) shall yield the right-of-way to 
other vehicles and to pedestrians law-
fully within the intersection or an adja-
cent crosswalk at the time the signal is 
exhibited; and 
(B) may not turn right or left if a sign 
at the intersection prohibits the turn. 
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow sig-
nal shown alone or in combination with other 
indication: 
(i) may cautiously enter the intersection 
only to moke the movement indicated by the 
arrow or other indication shown at the same 
time; and 
(ii) shall yield the right-of-way to pedes-
trians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk 
and to other traffic lawfully using the inter-
section. 
(c) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians 
facing any green signal other than a green turn 
arrow may proceed across the roadway within 
any marked or unmarked crosswalk. 
(3) (a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular 
yellow or yellow arrow signal is warned that the 
allowable movement related to a green signal is 
being terminated. 
(b) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians 
facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow 
signal ore advised that there is insufficient time 
to cross the roadway before a red indication is 
shown, and a pedestrian may not start to cross 
the roadway. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c), ve-
hicular traffic facing a steady circular red or red 
arrow signal: 
(i) may not enter the intersection unless 
entering the iintersection to make a move-
ment permitted by another indication; and 
(ii) shall stop at a clearly marked stop 
line, but if none, before entering the marked 
or unmarked crosswalk on the near side of 
the intersection and shall remain stopped 
until an indication to proceed is shown, 
(b) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians 
facing a steady red signal alone may not enter 
steady red signal may cautiously enter the 
intersection to turn right, or may turn left 
from a one-way street into a one-way street, 
after stopping as required by Subsection 
(4)(a). 
(ii) The vehicular traffic shall yield the 
right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within 
an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic 
lawfully using the intersection. 
(5) (a) This section applies where an official traf-
fic-control signal is erected and maintained at an 
intersection or at a place other than an intersec-
tion. 
(b) Any stop required shall be made at a sign 
or marking on the highway pavement indicating 
where the stop shall be made, but, in the absence 
of any sign or marking, the stop shall be made it 
the signal. 
(6) The operator of a vehicle approaching an inter* 
section that has an official traffic-control signal that 
is inoperative shall stop before entering the Intersec-
tion and shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle M 
required under Section 41-6-72. INS 
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals — 
Meaning of signals — Rights and do* 
ties. 
When special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting 
the words "Walk" or "Don't Walk" or symbols of 
"Walking Person" or "Upraised Palm" are in plaoa, 
the signals indicate: A 
(a) Flashing or steady "Walk" or symbol of 
"Walking Person" means a pedestrian facing the 
signal may proceed across the roadway in the 
direction of the signal and the operators of all 
vehicles shall yield the right-of-way to him. 
(b) Flashing or steady "Don't Walk" of 
"Upraised Palm" means a pedestrian may not 
start to cross the roadway in the direction of the 
signal, but a pedestrian who has partially conv\ 
pleted his crossing on the walk signal shall pro-
ceed to a sidewalk or safety island while the 
"Don't Walk" or "Upraised Palm" signal is show-
ing. Ittf 
41 -6-26. Flashing red or yel low signals — Rights 
and duties of operators — RallroW 
grade crossings excluded. 
(1) When an illuminated flashing red or yellow tig* 
nal is used in a traffic signal or with a traffic ilgn, 
vehicular traffic shall obey it as follows: 
(a) Flashing red stop signal: When a red signal 
is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, op-
erators of vehicles shall stop at a clearly marked 
stop line, but if none, before entering the cross-
walk on the nearest side of the intersection, or If 
none, then at a point nearest the intersecting 
roadway where the operator has a view of ap» 
proaching traffic on the intersecting roadway be-
fore entering. The right to proceed is subject It 
the rules applicable after making a stop at a step 
sign. 
(b) Flashing yellow caution signal: When I 
yellow signal is illuminated with rapid intermit-
tent flashes, operators of vehicles may proceed 
through the intersection or past the signal otiy 
with caution. 
(2) This section does not apply at railroad gnsiV 
O I O IV1U1VJIV. YE*Illl/LiILi3 i i - o - j ; 
41-6-26.5. Lane use control signals — Colors. 
When lane use control signals are placed over indi-
vidual lanes, the signals indicate and apply to opera-
tors of vehicles as follows: 
(1) Green signal — vehicular traffic may 
travel in any lane over which a green signal is 
shown. 
(2) Steady yellow signal — vehicular traffic is 
warned that a lane control change is being made. 
(3) Steady red signal — vehicular traffic may 
not enter or travel in any lane over which a red 
signal is shown. 
(4) Flashing yellow signal — vehicular traffic 
may use the lane only for the purpose of ap-
proaching and making a left turn. iwn 
41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, sig-
nals, lights or markings — Commercial 
advertising — Public nuisance — Re-
moval. 
(1) A person may not place, maintain, or display 
upon or in view of any highway any unauthorized 
•ign, signal, light, marking, or device which purports 
to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official 
traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal, or au-
thorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or which: 
(a) attempts to direct the movement of traffic; 
(b) hides from view or interferes with the effec-
tiveness of any official traffic-control device or 
any railroad sign or signal; or 
(c) which is of such brilliant illumination and 
so positioned as to blind or dazzle an operator on 
any adjacent highway. 
(2) A person may not place or maintain nor may 
any public authority permit upon any highway any 
traffic sign or signal bearing on it any commercial 
advertising except for business signs included as part 
of official motorist service panels approved by the De-
partment of Transportation. This provision does not 
prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent 
to highways of signs giving useful directional infor-
mation and of a type that may not be mistaken for 
official signs. 
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or mark-
ing Is declared to be a public nuisance and the au-
thority having jurisdiction over the highways may 
remove it or cause it to be removed without notice. 
1987 
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals 
prohibited. 
A person may not without lawful authority attempt 
to or in fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or re-
move any official traffic-control device or any railroad 
sign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia 
•tilt, or any other part of it. ies7 
ARTICLE 4 
ACCIDENTS 
41-6-29. Operator's duty at accident — Stop nt 
accident — Penalty. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an acci-
oVnt resulting in injury to or death of any person 
•hall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immedi-
ately return to and remain at the scene of the acci-
dent until he has fulfilled the reauirements of Section 
(2) A person falling to stop or to comply with th 
requirements of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class 1 
misdemeanor. is* 
41-6-30. Accidents Involving damage to vehicl 
or property — Stop at accident. 
The operator of a vehicle involved In an acciden 
resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other prop 
erty which Is operated or attended by any persor 
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of th 
accident or as close to it as possible, and shall Imme 
diately return to and remain at the scene of the ace 
dent until he has fulfilled the requirements of Sectio 
41-6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more tha 
Is necessary. IP> 
41-6-31. Accident involving Injury, death, 0 
property damage — Duties of operatoi 
occupant, owner, 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ace 
dent resulting In Injury to or death of any person c 
damage to any vehicle or other property, if the veh 
cle or other property is operated, occupied, or a 
tended by any person or if the owner of the vehicle c 
property is present, shall: 
(a) give to the persons involved his name, a< 
dress, and the registration number of the vehicl 
he Is operating; 
(b) upon request and if available, exhibit h 
operator's license to: 
(i) any investigating pence officer presen 
(ii) the person struck; 
(Hi) the operator, occupant of, or perse 
attending the vehicle or other property dar 
aged In the accident; and 
(iv) the owner of property damaged in tl 
accident, if present; and 
(c) render to any person injured in the collisir 
reasonable assistance, Including the transpor 
ing, or the making of arrangements for the tron 
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, 
hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it 
apparent that treatment is necessary or if tl 
transporting is requested by the Injured perso 
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ac< 
dent resulting in injury to or death of any person 
property damage to an apparent extent of $750 
more shall immediately and by the quickest means 
communication available give notire of the accide 
to the nearest office of a law enforcement agenc 
(3) If the operator of a vehicle is physically incsp 
ble of giving an immediate notice of an accident 
required in Subsections (1) and (2) and there is a 
other occupant in the vehicle at the time of the ac< 
dent capable of giving an immediate notice. il« •"•r 
pant shall give or cause to be given the n . . 1 
quired of the operator under this section. 
(4) If the operator \r. physically incapable of mn 
ing a written report of an accident when requir 
under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of t 
vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in t 
accident shall within 15 days afier becoming aware 
the accident make the report required of the opornl 
under this section. 1 
41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle 
other property — Duties of operate 
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or 
involved in an accident with any vehicle or oil 
property which is unattended snd which results 
Hamncp in the oth#»r vehirJp nr nrnwriv nhnll imm» 
..IIC noving aiconol In 
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug or that governs In relation to any of those 
matters the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, 
or evidentiary presumptions or penalties or that 
governs any combination of those matters shall be 
consistent with the provisions in this code which gov 
ern those matters 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs reckless driving or operating a vehicle In 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of 
this code which govern those matters 1W7 
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41 6-44 Driving u n d e r the Influence of alcohol, 
d rugs , o r with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concen t ra t ion — Mea 
s u r e m e n t of blood or b rea th alcohol — 
Criminal p u n i s h m e n t — Arres t with 
out w a r r a n t — Penal t ies — Suspens ion 
or revoca t ion of l icense — Penal t ies 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if 
the person 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentra 
tion of 08 grams or greater as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control or 
(li) is under the influence of alcohol any 
drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehi 
cle 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violat 
ing this section is or has been legally entitled to 
use alcohol or a drug Is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood and alcohol concentration in the breath shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time 
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a 
(i) class B misdemeanor or 
(li) class A misdemeanor if the person 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury 
upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negh 
gent manner or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of 
age In the vehicle at the time of the of 
fense 
(b) fn this section the standard of negligence 
is that of simple negligence the failure to exer 
cine that d< ^ree of care that an oidmanly reason 
able and prudent person exercises under like or 
similar circumstances 
(c) in this section a reference to this section 
tnclulrs any similar local oidinance adopted in 
compliance with Section 41 6 43 
4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court 
shall upon a first conviction impose a manda 
tory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours nor more than 240 hours 
(b) The court may as an alternative to jail 
require the person to work in a community ser 
vice >\ork program for not less than 24 hours nor 
more than 50 hours 
(c) (t) In addition to the jail sentence or com 
munity service work program, the court 
shall order the person to participate In in 
assessment and educational series at a II* 
censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili* 
tatton facility as appropriate 
(n) For a violation committed after July 1, 
1993, the court may order the person to ob-
tain treatment at an alcohol or drug depen 
dency rehabilitation facility if the licensed 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation fa 
cility determines that the person has a prob-
lem condition involving alcohol or drugs 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of a prior violation 
under this section the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 
720 hours 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community ser-
vice work program for not less than 80 hours nor 
more than 240 hours 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or comma 
nity service work program the court shall order 
the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or druf 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropri-
ate The court may, in its discretion, order tht 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of two prior violations under thia 
section is a 
(0 class B misdemeanor except as |m> 
vided in Subsections (n) and (7), and 
(n) class A misdemeanor if both of tht 
prior convictions are for violations commit-
ted after April 23, 1990 j> 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall 
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 720 nor roort 
than 2 160 hours 
(n) The court may, as an alternative U 
jail require the person to work in a comim> 
nity service work program for not less thai 
240 nor more than 720 hours * 
(in) In addition to the jail sentence or eott* 
munity service work program, the court 
shall order the person to obtain treatment al 
an alcohol oh drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate # 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(n) the court shall 
as part of any sentence impose a fine of not 
less than $1 000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor mora 
than 2 160 hours * 
(ii) The court may as an alternative It 
jail require the person to work in a comiwa* 
nity service work program for not less that 
240 nor more than 720 hours but only if U* 
court enters in writing on the record the raa> 
son it finds the defendant should not e m t 
the jail sentence Enrollment in and cornplt-
tion of an alcohol or drug dependency reha-
bilitation program approved by the court 
may be a sentencing alternative to incartar* 
ation or community service if the progrtJi 
provides intensive care or inpatient tratfV 
ment and long term closely supervised fotlav 
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(in) In addition to the jail sentence or com 
munity service work program, the court 
shall order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a vio 
lation committed within six years of the prior 
violations under this section Is a third degree fel 
ony if at least three prior convictions are for vio 
lations committed after April 23 1990 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence im 
pose a fine of not less than $1 000 and impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
hours nor more than 2 160 hours 
(c) (i) The court may as an alternative to jail 
require the person to work in a community 
service work program for not less than 240 
nor more than 720 hours, but only if the 
court enters in writing on the record the rea 
son it finds the defendant should not serve 
the jail sentence 
(li) Enrollment in and completion of an al 
cohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro 
gram approved by the court may be a sen 
tencing alternative to incarceration or com 
munity service if the program provides in 
tensive care or inpatient treatment and long 
term closely supervised follow through after 
the treatment 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or commu 
nity service work program the court shall order 
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence re 
quired under this section may not be suspended 
and the convicted person is not eligible for parole 
or probation until any sentence Imposed under 
this section has been served Probation or parole 
resulting from a conviction for a violation under 
this section may not be terminated 
(b) The department may not reinstate any li 
cense suspended or revoked as a result of the con 
viction under this section until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the 
department that 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency 
assessment, education treatment and reha 
bilttation ordered for a violation committed 
after July 1, 1993, have been completed 
(li) all fines and fees including fees for res 
titution and rehabilitation costs assessed 
against the person have been paid if the con 
viction Is a second or subsequent conviction 
for a violation committed within six years of 
a prior violation and 
(in) the person does not use drugs in any 
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili 
tation facility if the conviction is for a third 
or subsequent conviction for a violation com 
mitted within six years of two prior viola 
tions committed after July 1 1993 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4) (5) 
(6) and (7) that require a sentencing court to 
order a convicted person to participate in on 
assessment and educational series at a li 
censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili 
tation facility, obtain in the discretion of the 
court treatment at an alcohol or drug depen 
dency rehabilitation facility, obtain mn«/i«. 
combination of those things apply to a con 
viction for a violation of Section 41 6 45 the 
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsec 
tion (10) 
(li) The court shall render the same ordei 
regarding education or treatment at an nlco 
hoi or drug dependency rehabilitation facil 
ity, or both In connection with a first sec 
ond, or subsequent conviction under Section 
41 6 45 that qualifies as a prior conviction 
under Subsection (10) as the court would 
render in connection with applying respec 
tlvely, the first second or subsequent con 
viction requirements of Subsections (4) (5) 
(6) and (7) 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a con 
viction under Section 41 6 45 that qualified as a 
prior conviction under Subsection (10) is a first 
second or subsequent conviction under this sub 
section a previous conviction under either this 
section or Section 41 6 45 Is considered a prior 
conviction 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita 
tion program and any community based or other 
education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human 
Services 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a viola 
tion of Section 41 6 45 or of an ordinance en 
acted under Section 41 b 43 in satisfaction 
of or as a substitute for an original charge 
of a violation of this section the prosecution 
shall state for the record a factual basis for 
the plea including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol drugs or a com 
binatlon of both by the defendant in connec 
tion with the violation 
(n) The statement is an ofier of proof of 
the facts that shows whether there was con 
sumption of alcohol drugs or a combination 
of both by the defendant in connection with 
the violation 
(b) (I) The court shall advise the defendant be 
fore accepting the plea ofTered under this 
subsection of the consequences of a violation 
of Section 41 6 45 as follows 
(il) If the court accepts the defendants 
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of 
violating Section 41 6 45 and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was conaump 
tion of alcohol drugs or a combination of 
both by the defendant in connection with 
the violation the resulting conviction is a 
prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec 
tions (5) (6) and (7) 
(c) The court shall notify the department of 
each conviction of Section 41 6 15 that is a prior 
offense for the purposes of Subsections (5) (6) 
and (7) 
(11) A peace officer may without a warrant arrest 
a person for a violation of this section when the offi 
cer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred although not in his presence and if the offi 
cer has probable cause to believe that the violation 
was committed by the person 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operators li 
cense of a person rnnt>i"»~J * • 
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under Subsection (1) tf the violation is com 
mltted within a period of six years from the 
date of the prior violation 
(b) The department shall subtract from any 
suspension or revocation period the number of 
days for which a license was previously sus 
pended under Section 63 3 223, if the previous 
suspension was based on the eame occurrence 
upon which the record of conviction is based 19M 
41 8 44 1 Procedures — Adjudicative proceed 
ings 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with 
the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
46b in its adjudicative proceedings 1087 
41 6 44 2 Repealed IWW 
41 6 44 3 Standards for chemical breath analy 
sis — Evidence 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the adminlstra 
tion and interpretation of chemical analysis of a per 
eons breath Including standards of training 
(2) In any action or proceeding In which It is mate 
rial to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influ 
ence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood 
or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited docu 
ments offered as memoranda or records of acts condi 
tions or events to prove that the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate according to 
standards established in Subsection (1), are admlssi 
ble if 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about 
the time of the act, condition or event, and 
(b) the source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstances of their prepa 
ration indicate their trustworthiness 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection 
(2) have been met there is a presumption that the 
test results are valid and further foundation for Intro 
duction of the evidence is unnecessary 1&87 
41 6 44 4 Person under 21 may not operate ve 
h ide with detectable alcohol In body 
— Chemical teat procedures — Tempo 
rary license — Hearing and decision — 
Suspension of license or operating 
privilege — Fees — Judicial review 
(1) (a) As used in this section local substance 
abuse authority has the same meaning as pro 
vided in Section 62A 8 101 
(b) Calculations of blood breath or urine alco 
hoi concentration under this section shall be 
made in accordance with the procedures in Sub 
section 41 6 44(2) 
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age may 
not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle with any mensurable blood breath or 
urine alcohol concentration in his body as shown 
by a chemical test 
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license 
who violates Subsection (a), in addition to 
any other applicable penalties arising out of 
the incident shall have his operator license 
denied or suspended as provided In Subsec 
deny the perBon'a operator license if or 
dered or not challenged under this sec-
tion for a period of 90 days beginning oil 
the 30th day alter the date of the arret! 
under Section 32A 12 209 
(B) For a second or subsequent offense 
under Subsection (a), within three yearn 
of a prior denial or suspension, tht 
Driver License Division shall suspend 
the persona operator license for a period 
of one year beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest 
(c) (i) A person who has not been Issued an 
operator hcense who violates Subsection (a), 
in addition to any other penalties arising out 
of the incident, shall be punished as provided 
in Subsection (ii) 
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, which* 
ever is longer, a person may not operate t 
vehicle and the Driver License Division may 
not Issue the person an operator license or 
learners permit 
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person may be violatinf 
or has violated Subsection (2) the peace officer 
may in connection with arresting the person for 
a violation of Section 32A 12 209, request thai 
the person submit to a chemical test or tests ta be 
administered in compliance with the standard! 
under Section 41 6 44 10 
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person 
prior to the persona submission to a chemical 
test that a test result indicating a violation ef 
Subsection (2)(a) will result in denial or suspeo* 
sion of the person's license to operate a motor 
vehicle or a refusal to issue a license 
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and 
the test results indicate a blood breath, or urine 
alcohol content in violation of Subsection (2XaX 
or if the officer makes a determination, based e* 
reasonable grounds that the person is otherwise 
in violation of Subsection (2)(a) the officer direct* 
ing administration of the test or making the de-
termination shall serve on the person on behalf 
of the Driver License Division Immediate notice 
of the Driver License Division s intention to deny 
or suspend the person a license to operate a retaV 
cle or refusal to issue a license under Subsection 
(2) k 
(4) When the officer serves Immediate notice #ft 
behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall 
(a) take the Utah license certificate or pern** 
if any of the operator, 
(b) issue a temporary license certificate eft*** 
tive for only 29 days if the driver had t Vatt| 
operators license, and 
(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be ap-
proved by the Driver License Division, basic la> 
formation regarding how to obtain a proOfi 
hearing before the Driver License Division 
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved 
as to form by the Driver License Division, eenre ela) 
as the temporary Hcense certificate under SubeecUet 
(4Kb) 
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall leal 
to the Driver License Division within five dayi alia? 
the date of arrest and service of the notice 
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(c) a signed report on a form approved by the 
Driver License Division indicating the chemical 
test results, If any, and 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determine 
tion that the person has violated Subsection (2) 
(?) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver Li 
cense Division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after 
the date of arrest under Section 32A 12 209 
(ii) The request shall be made within ten 
days of the date of the arrest 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the 
Driver License Division in the county in which 
the arrest occurred, unless the Driver License Di 
vision and tho person agree that the hearing may 
be held in some other county 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall 
cover the issues of 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the person was operating 
a motor vehicle In violation of Subsection 
(2)(a), 
fn) whether the person refused to submit 
to the test, and 
(m) the test results if any 
(d) In connection with a hearing the Driver Li 
cense Division or its authorised agent may ad 
minister oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of rel 
evant books and papers 
(e) One or more members of the Driver License 
Division may conduct the hearing 
(0 Any decision made after a hearing before 
any number of the members of the Driver I i 
cense Division is as valid as if made after a hear 
Ing before the full membership of the Driver Li 
cense Division 
(g) After the hearing the Driver License Divi 
alon shall order whether the person 
(l) with a valid license to operate a motor 
vehicle will have his license denied or not or 
suspended or not, or 
(ii) without a valid operator license will be 
refused a license under Subsection (2)(c) 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing in hold 
fails to appear before the Driver License Division 
aa required in the notice the division shall order 
whether the person shall have his license denied 
suspended or not denied or suspended or 
whether an operator license will be refused or not 
refused 
(8) (a) Following denial or suspension the Driver 
License Division shall assess against a person in 
addition to any fee Imposed under Subsection 
63 3 205(14) a fee under Section 53 3 105 which 
shall be paid before the person s driving privilege 
la reinstated to cover administrative costs This 
fee shall be canceled if the person obtains an un 
appealed Driver License Division hearing or 
court decision that the suspension was not 
proper 
(b) A person whose operator license has been 
denied suspended, or postponed by the Driver 
License Division under this section may file a 
petition within 30 daya after the suspension for a 
hearing on the matter which if held is governed 
by Section 63 3 224 
(9) After reinstatement of an operator license for a 
Iret offense under this section a report authorized 
of any other offense for which the denial or suspen 
sion may be extended 
(10) The provisions of 8ectlona 4l-12a411 and 
41 12a 412 do not apply to a denial or suspension 
imposed for a first offense under this section if the 
denial or suspension is based solely on a violation of 
Subsectioa (2)(a) 
(11) (a) In addition to the penalties In Subsection 
(2) a person who violates Subsection (2)(a) shall 
be referred by the Driver I icense Division to the 
local substance abuse authoritv for an assess 
ment and recommendation for appropriate ac 
tion 
(b) (i) Reinstatement of the persons operator 
license or the right to obtain an operator li 
cenae is contingent upon successful comple 
tion of the action recommended by the local 
substance abuse authority 
(ii) The local substance abuse authority s 
recommended action shall be determined by 
an assessment of the person s alcohol abuse 
and may include 
(A) a targeted education and preven 
tion program, 
(B) an early intervention program or 
(C) a suhstance abuse treatment pro 
gram 
(ill) Successful completion of the recom 
mended action shall be determined by stnn 
dards established by the Division of Sub 
stance Abuse 
(c) At the conclusion of the penalty period lm 
posed under Subsection (2) the local substance 
abuse authority shall notify the Driver license 
Division of the person s status regarding comple 
tion of the recommended action 
(d) The local substance abuse authorities shall 
cooperate with the Driver License Division in 
(i) conducting the assessments 
(u) making appropriate recommendations 
for action, and 
(ill) notifying the Driver I icense Division 
about the persons status regarding comple 
tion of the recommended action 
(e) (I) The local substance abuse authority is 
responsible for 
(A) the cost of the assessment of the 
person s alcohol abuse and 
(B) for making a referral to nn appro 
priate program on the basis of the find 
Ings of the assessment 
(il) (A) The person who violated Subsec 
tion (2KB) IS responsible for all costs and 
fees associated with the recommended 
program to which the pernnn is referred 
(B) fhe costs and foes under Subsec 
tion (A) shall be based on a sliding senh 
consistent with the local substinc< 
abuse authority s policies and practice 
regarding fee* tor services IM 
41 6 44 5 Admissibility of chemtcn! test result 
in actions for driving under the Influ 
ence — Weight of evidence 
(1) (a) in any civil or criminal action or proceedin 
in which it is material to prove that a person wa 
operating or in actual physical control of a veh 
cle while under the influence of alcohol or dru^ 
or with a blood or breath alcohol content stati 
tnrilv nrohibited the results of a chemical test c 
